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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do Utah State Courts have personal 
jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer and/or a Japanese 
exporter for a personal injury claim that arises out of the use 
of one of their "Japanese" products in Utah, when the product 
is regularly offered for sale in Utah, but was actually 
purchased in Idaho? 
2. Did Japanese manufacturer Hirota Tekko 
K.K. waive its claim that the Utah state courts did not have 
personal jurisdiction over it by submitting a pro se answer to 
Mansour's counsel, that was addressed to the Utah District 
Court? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes and rules of civil procedure 
may be controlling and determinative of this issue: 
a. Utah Code Ann, §78-27-24(3) (the Utah 
long-arm statute) states as follows: 
Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent does 
any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising 
from: . • . 
(3) The causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; . . . 
b. Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states as follows: 
Waiver of Defenses. 
A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that 
the defense of failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, the defense of 
failure to join an indispensable party, and the 
objection of failure to state a legal defense to 
a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if 
one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on 
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the 
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, 
the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, 
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) 
in the light of any evidence that may have been 
received. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce Parry filed this action 
for personal injuries he incurred through the use of a WECO 
chopping maul. He named as defendants the Japanese 
manufacturer, Hirota Tekko, K.K., a respondent herein, 
Japanese exporter Okada Hardware Company, Ltd., a respondent 
herein , U.S. importer Mansour, Inc., an appellant herein, 
United States wholesaler Pacific Marine Schwabacher, and 
United States retailers Ernst Home Centers and Pay fN Pack. 
Defendants, and third-party defendants, Okada and 
Hirota are Japanese business entities. They each filed 
motions to dismiss all the claims against them, on the basis 
that the Utah court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. On 
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February 25, 1986, the Second Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding, entered a ruling granting 
each motion to dismiss. 
On March 17, 1986, Bruce G. Parry filed a motion with 
the Second Judicial District Court asking Judge Page to 
reconsider his ruling dismissing the claims against Okada and 
Hirota. 
On April 17, 1986, Judge Page entered a second ruling 
and an order affirming his earlier decision to dismiss all 
claims against Okada and Hirota. On April 30, 1986, 
plaintiff Bruce G. Parry filed a motion to have the Court's 
order certified as a final order under Rule 54(e). 
On May 5, 1986, Judge Page entered an amended order 
dismissing all claims against Okada and Hirota and 
specifically finding that his order of dismissal was a final 
order as defined by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Appellant Mansour originally filed a notice of 
appeal on May 21, 1986. Plaintiff Bruce G. Parry joined in the 
appeal by filing an amended notice of appeal on May 30, 1986. 
II 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff Bruce G. Parry was injured on January 3, 
1981, while chopping wood with a WECO chopping maul. The 
WECO chopping maul was originally manufactured by respondent 
Hirota. Hirota sold the product to Japanese exporter 
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Okada Hardware. (Finding of Fact, Nc ~, February 25, 198 0 
Ruling attached -endix '"A.") 
Okada Hardware soli1 the pn; ^ United States 
importer appellant Mansour, Ir« Mansour , so id ll«i-« 
produ • - -• Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Pacific 
Marine Schwabachei Jbutor, sold the 
product retailers Ernst Home Center and Pay l\\ l-ack. 
(Pii -, A :, February 25, 1986 Ruling, 
attached as Appendix "A.") 
The chopping maul Mr „
 v , urchased 
i, ) l,m«1a Thayne from an Ernst retail outlet . . : : hi 
Thayne purchased tin chopping maul *- a Christmas present for 
her father, who resides in Utah, -. * the maul to 
her" father at Christmas in 198 0 ^ Parry borrower -^  v.l 
from, Mr Thayne, and was using i t :i i i Utah at the Lime of the 
accident. (Findings of F act, Nos 6 K "', February 25, 1986 
Ruling, attached as Appendix MA.") 
A • ? * * e Injury, Ernst and Pay fN Pack 
advertised and model of chopping maul 
in their; retail outlets throughout Utah (E* -•" \nswers to 
Interrogatories, attached as Appendix "B," Apr., , 19B6 
Ruling, n' t tu.ii(*• i a& Appendix ,fC,ff) 
Mansour had submitted nunierous orders to Okada 
Hardware for an extended period of time pr K M IM January1 3, 
orders included the purchase and importatioii of 
WECO products in, (i -; n J» i ,i | . huppincj mauls identical to the one 
involved here. During the transactioi i of business with Okada 
and Hirota, Mansourfs representatives traveled to Japan to 
confer with representatives from Okada and Hirota. During 
this same period, representatives from Okada and Hirota 
traveled to Los Angeles to confer with representatives from 
Mansour. During these discussions the Mansour 
representatives explained the nature of their business, 
including the fact that they intended to sell and distribute 
the Japanese products throughout the western United States. 
The Okada and Hirota representatives never placed any 
restrictions upon the sale of their products into any 
particular region or state. (Affidavit of Mansour, paras. 7 
& 8, attached as Appendix ffD.fl) 
Mansour Inc.'s Third-Party Complaint was served upon 
Hirota pursuant to the Utah long-arm statute and the 
Hague Convention. On or about September 9, 1985, Robert G. 
Gilchrist, counsel for Mansour, received a letter styled as 
an Answer, dated August 26, 1985, and signed by Hirotafs 
president Masakazu Hirota. Mr. Hirotafs "Answer" stated 
that his company had no responsibility for this action. (See 
attached letter, Appendix "E.") On the same date, September 9, 
1985, the letter was forwarded by Mr. Gilchrist to the Second 
Judicial District Court for the State of Utah. Subsequently, 
Hirota filed its Motion to Dismiss. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants seek to have Judge Pagefs order of 
dismissal set aside for two reason. First, on the basis 
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that tnt "'..Hi otalt1 courts have jurisdiction over both Japanese 
defendants, fhe i1,,1! t>upi eini < (IMJII 'LIS developed a stream of 
commerce theory and foreseeability test, that "-.NIHS ' hat if a 
manufacture! r directly or indirectly places ' *-- product in a 
statefs market, that unreasonable for the 
manufacturer to be subject to jurisdicti .1 in i I.IM state. The 
Japanese,- manufacturer and exporter sold this product •. 
importer, knowjui 1 1.11 it would be sold throughout the western 
United States. The product was sol d 01 1 a 1 egular basis '. the 
State of Utah. The actual maul in question was p -;> 
the Japanese manufacturer and exporter had 
placed the same product 111 ''tali1,1- stream of commerce, they had 
the necessary minimum contacts for the Utah si,ate courts to 
exej'visp lurisdiction over them. 
Secondly, Hiroi.a has waived any jurisdictional 
claims The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that the 
defense of lack oersonal jurisdiction be raised in the 
defendan esponsive pleading. Defendant Hirota 
submitted a pro respons ounsel or record, 
denying that :* lad any responsibility .nis 
response •.-*?• captioned as . answer and was sent t -he only 
address that - 4 It was immediately 
submitted to t Second Judicial Mansour's 
count • record. The answer did not claim the Cuuit .11 d not 
have , ^  sdiction over Hirota, Therefore this 
defense was waived. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH STATE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE JAPANESE 
MANUFACTURER AND JAPANESE EXPORTER UNDER THE 
STREAM OF COMMERCE THEORY. 
This matter involves a personal injury claim arising 
out of the use of an allegedly defective product. The product 
was manufactured and sold by various non-Utah entities. 
The plaintiff and third-party plaintiff thus have had to rely 
on the Utah Long-Arm Statute, U.C.A. §78-27-24 to 
obtain jurisdiction over these defendants. Specifically, the 
plaintiff and third-party plaintiff have relied on a section of 
this statute which states as follows: 
Any person, not withstanding section 
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself and if an 
individual, his personal representative, to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state as to any claim arising from: . . . 
(3) The causing of any injury within this 
state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty; . . . 
Mr. Parry was injured while using the Japanese 
product in the State of Utah. Therefore, this provision of the 
Long-Arm Statute was met. However, this Court has repeatedly 
stated that Utah court1s must have jurisdiction under both the 
Utah Long-Arm Statute and under the federal principles of due 
process. Mabud v. United Airlines, 717 P.2d 1350, (Utah 
1986). 
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The principle of due process through "minimum 
contacts" was set out by the United States Supreme Court in the 
landmark case of International Shoe Co. v, State of 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). 
This principle is that before a state can invoke jurisdiction 
over a non-resident defendant, it must be determined that the 
defendant had certain minimum contacts with the state. 
This principle was refined by the United States 
Supreme Court in the case of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). In Hanson v. 
Denckla, the court held that to obtain jurisdiction over a 
non-resident, in addition to minimum contacts, it must be 
shown that the non-resident defendant also availed itself of 
the privileges of the forum state's laws. 
The United States Supreme Court expanded this 
doctrine into the "stream of commerce" theory in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 
62 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the 
plaintiffs had purchased an Audi automobile in New York. 
They were then involved in an accident in Oklahoma. A product 
liability action was filed in Oklahoma naming as defendants the 
manufacturer, the importer, the distributor, and the retailer. 
The manufacturer and importer conceded jurisdiction. The trial 
court granted the retailer's motion to dismiss on the basis 
that it did not have minimum contacts with Oklahoma. On appeal 
this was affirmed. However, in reaching this decision, the 
court distinguished the situations of the manufacturer and 
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importer from that of the distributor and retailer. The court 
stated that if a manufacturer's or distributor's sale of a 
product is not an isolated occurrence, but instead is an 
attempt to "directly or indirectly" serve the market for its 
product in other states, then it is not unreasonable for it to 
be subject to suit in one of those foreign states if its 
product causes an injury there. A manufacturer indirectly 
serves a market by placing its project in the "stream of 
commerce" where it can foresee that it will be sold in other 
states• 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied 
the stream of commerce theory to Utah law in the case of 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Philadelphia Resins 
Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985). The facts in 
Philadelphia Resins were that an individual pilot, Mr. 
Rogers, while residing in Arkansas, ordered various cable 
products from defendant Philadelphia Resins Corp., a 
Pennsylvania corporation. Mr. Rogers then moved to Utah and 
brought the cable with him to use in his employment in Utah. 
The cable failed and caused an accident in Utah. The trial 
court found there was jurisdiction over the defendant. On 
appeal the Tenth Circuit Court reversed. 
In reaching its decision the Tenth Circuit Court 
reviewed the stream of commerce theory and examined the 
defendants1 contacts with the State of Utah. The court noted 
that the defendant had only made a minuscule number of sales of 
its products in Utah, may have advertised in magazines that 
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reached the State of Utah, and had its cable fail while in use 
there. The court determined that these were insufficient 
contacts with Utah. It determined that the defendant's 
representatives might have known their products were to be used 
in the Rocky Mountain region, but they could not specifically 
foresee that their product was destined for the Utah market. 
The court stated that if a defendant's product comes into Utah 
through the result of deliberate, "although perhaps indirect" 
efforts of the defendant, then jurisdiction exists. The court 
gave as an example a situation where a defendant indirectly 
places its product into the "stream of commerce" in another 
state with the expectation of its distribution in Utah. As a 
counter position, the court gave the example of a product 
coming into Utah through the fortuitous unconnected efforts of 
a third party. It stated that the Utah courts would not have 
jurisdiction in such a situation. This was the situation in 
Philadelphia Resins, as it was Rogers' actions and not those of 
the defendant that caused the product to come into Utah. 
This court dealt with the issue of jurisdiction in 
Utah over foreign retailers, but not foreign manufacturers, in 
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974). 
In Pellegrini, a California resident purchased a vehicle in 
California. She then moved to Utah, where she brought suit 
alleging negligence in dealer preparation and breach of 
warranty. She named as defendants the California retailer and 
Ford, the manufacturer. This court held there was no 
jurisdiction over the California retailer. However, the court 
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stated that there is a distinct difference between the 
manufacturer and the retailer, since the manufacturer is 
interested in selling its similar products in 
foreign states. 
This court addressed the same issue of jurisdiction 
over a foreign retailer in Burt Drilling, Inc. v. 
Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980). In Burt Drilling, 
a Utah plaintiff contacted a foreign defendant to request a 
price quotation for the purchase of drilling equipment. After 
negotiations the equipment was purchased and shipped to 
Denver. However, the parties stipulated for financial security 
reasons that the situs of the equipment was in Utah. Suit was 
filed. The trial court granted the retailer's motion to 
dismiss. On appeal, this court held that since the retailer 
sought the protection of Utah laws, that it was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Utah courts. In a concurring opinion 
Justice Stewart discussed the stream of commerce theory, and 
stated that there was also jurisdiction because the defendant 
had knowingly sold a product in Utah. 
In his concurring opinion Justice Stewart cited the 
Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Phillips v. Anchor Hocking 
Glass Corp., 413 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1966). In Phillips, the 
plaintiff, an Arizona resident, was injured when the 
defendant's baking dish shattered. The defendant was an Ohio 
corporation. There was no evidence where the dish was 
purchased. The defendant's products were sold throughout 
Arizona at the time the suit was filed. The trial court 
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granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal the 
Arizona Supreme Court rejected the "foreseeability" test. This 
test allows jurisdiction only where the defendant can foresee 
it might be 
sued. Instead, the Arizona court held that since manufacturers 
were more concerned with the overall sale of their products, 
not where the product is sold, that a "fairness" test should be 
applied. The court then held that whether it is fair to 
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident manufacturer should 
be determined by: 
1) The nature and size of the manufacturer's 
business; 
2) The economic independence of the plaintiff; and 
3) The nature of the cause of action, including the 
applicable law and pretrial matters. 
The product involved here, like many other products 
sold, distributed, and used in Utah, was manufactured in 
Japan. The Japanese sold the product through a California 
importer who distributed the product throughout the western 
United States. The Japanese representatives met with the 
importer and discussed the nature of the importer's business. 
They were told that the importer operated a regional business 
and that their products could thus end up at various locations 
throughout the United States. The importer in the course of 
selling and distributing Japanese products has routinely 
distributed products to companies in Utah. This product, a 
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chopping maul, was advertised and offered for regular sale in 
Utah by retailers Ernst Home Centers and Pay fN Pack. 
The specific maul which the plaintiff was using was 
purchased from Ernst in Idaho. It was brought to Utah by a 
third party. The plaintiff was injured while using it in Utah. 
The plaintiff originally brought suit against all the 
American entities who distributed and sold the product. The 
distributors and now the plaintiff seek to hold the 
manufacturer responsible for the defect, if any, in the 
product. The manufacturer and exporter have stated that since 
this specific product was purchased in Idaho that, even though 
the same product was offered for sale in Utah, the Utah courts 
do not have jurisdiction over them. 
Judge Page's Ruling of February 25, 1986, on which 
his order of dismissal is based, found that the subject 
logsplitter was purchased in Idaho and transported to Utah by 
a third party, where it caused the injury. He further found 
that there was no evidence that logsplitters such as the one 
in question had ever been advertised or sold in Utah. He also 
found that neither of the Japanese defendants had ever 
advertised or sold any products in the State of Utah. He then 
held, on the basis of the above cited cases, that the presence 
of the Japanese defendants in Utah was the result of the 
actions of an unconnected third party, or of fortuitous events 
over which they had no control, and not through their conscious 
efforts to serve the Utah market. 
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If the statement of facts relied upon by Judge Page 
was correct, his application of the law might also be correct. 
However, the findings of fact set forth in his Ruling are 
incorrect. It is undisputed that WECO chopping mauls were 
regularly advertised, sold and distributed in the Utah market 
at the time of injury as well as several years prior thereto. 
When the above facts are applied to the stream of 
commerce theory, it is apparent that the Utah courts have 
jurisdiction over the Japanese defendants. The Japanese 
manufacturer and exporter intended to and clearly did place 
WECO products in both the Western United States1 and Utah's 
stream of commerce. They knew that by selling the product to 
Mansour, a western regional importer, that the product would 
be distributed throughout the western United States. The 
products were then distributed throughout the western states, 
and specifically Utah. The Japanese thus directly served the 
Utah marketplace. As they were involved in the Utah stream of 
commerce they should be responsible if one of their products is 
defective and causes a problem in Utah. 
The Japanese argument that the Utah courts do not 
have jurisdiction over them because this product was sold in 
Idaho is not logical. If this were true, then all 
manufacturers who sell products in Utah can only be responsible 
if the specific product in question is purchased in Utah. In 
today's marketplace, manufacturers such as Toyota, Datsun, 
and in this case, Hirota Tekko, serve to profit from the 
sale of their products in Utah. Therefore, they should subject 
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themselves to the Utah court1s jurisdiction no matter where 
the specific defective product that causes the problem may have 
been purchased. Any other result will mean that a plaintiff 
who is injured by a product must track the origin of that 
specific product and the manufacturer to the place of sale, and 
then bring suit there. This is an undue burden to place on 
plaintiffs. Further, this is contrary to the due process 
provisions of the Federal Constitution, and also contrary to 
Utah law which attempts to find jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants to the fullest degree. 
Hirota and Okada had sufficient minimum contacts 
with Utah to be held responsible in Utah if appellant Parry had 
been injured by a WECO logsplitter that was purchased in 
Utah. The fact that this particular product was purchased in 
Idaho does not suddenly erase these minimum contacts. 
Therefore, appellants respectfully request that this 
Court enter a ruling reversing the trial court and finding that 
the State of Utah has jurisdiction over Japanese manufacturer, 
Hirota Tekko, K.K., and Japanese exporter Okada Hardware, 
and remand this matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
II 
HIROTA TEKKO WAIVED ITS JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT BY 
SUBMITTING A PRO SE ANSWER TO MANSOURfS COUNSEL OF RECORD. 
The summons and a copy of the third-party complaint 
were served upon third-party defendant Hirota Tekko, 
K.K. on or about August 10, 1985. Mr. Masakuzo Hirota, 
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the president of Hirota Tekko, mailed to Mansour's 
counsel of record a statement directed to the Second District 
Court in and for Davis County. The statement, which is 
attached as Appendix "E,M said Mwe havenft any responsibility 
about this matter, Civil No. 33206.fl The document was signed 
in both English and Japanese by Mr. Hirota. The address of 
the Second Judicial District Court was not contained on the 
summons or third-party complaint. The only address on these 
documents was that of Mansourfs counsel of record. Therefore 
the Hirota statement was mailed directly to this counsel. 
Upon receipt, Mansour's counsel of record mailed the 
statement directly to the clerk of court for Davis County. 
The Hirota statement makes no claims about 
jurisdiction. Instead, these claims were raised for the first 
time in Hirota1s motion to dismiss. 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the 
person may be asserted in a responsive pleading, or may be made 
by motion before any further pleading is required. Rule 12(h) 
states that a party waives all defenses and objections which it 
does not present either by motion, or if no motion is filed, in 
its answer or reply, other than the defense of failure to state 
a claim, or the defense of lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. An objection to a jurisdictional defect is 
waived if not asserted by the party as provided in Rule 12(h). 
Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976). 
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In this matter, Hirotafs president prepared his own 
pro se response to the summons and complaint that was served 
upon him. He did not raise any jurisdictional issues in this 
answer. Instead, he made a general denial and statement that 
his organization had no responsibility for this matter. This 
document was then submitted by mail to the third-party 
plaintiff's counsel, who forwarded it to the Court. 
Hirotafs letter was a responsive pleading that was 
adequate to put plaintiff's claims against this defendant at 
issue amd avoid default. (See Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1975); Lord v. Shaw# 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983) 
71 C.J.S. Pleading, Sec. 103-105.) 
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that the contents of summons inform the defendant that 
he must answer the complaint in writing within a certain time 
or suffer a default judgment. It does not require that the 
answer be typed, prepared by an attorney or otherwise meet the 
formal requirements of pleadings. In addition,, fundamental 
due process requires the summons to adequately inform the 
defendant what must be done to avoid default. The summons 
served on Hirota only required it to answer the complaint in 
writing and file it with the Court Clerk to prevent a default. 
This is precisely what Hirota intended to do and eventually 
did. To now hold that the letter is not a sufficient answer 
would be contrary to Utah constitutional law pertaining to 
procedural due process. 
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The Masakazu Hirota document was the first thing 
filed on Hirota1s behalf with the Davis County clerk of 
court. It did not raise the jurisdictional issues. Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 12(h), this defense was waived. Since the 
defense was waived, the district court was in error in allowing 
the motion to dismiss to proceed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the appellants ask this Court to 
reverse the trial court's order of dismissal for two reasons. 
First, because the Utah courts have personal jurisdiction over 
the Japanese manufacturer and exporter. These Japanese 
entities manufactured and sold products that eventually were 
sold in Utah. This is sufficient to give the Utah courts 
jurisdiction over them if a like product, even though purchased 
in Idaho, causes a personal injury in Utah. 
Secondly, manufacturer Hirota waived any 
jurisdictional defense by filing a pro se answer. This answer 
was the first responsive pleading filed and did not raise the 
jurisdictional defense. Therefore, as the trial court erred in 
entering its order of dismissal, appellants seek a ruling from 
this Court finding the Utah courts have jurisdiction over the 
Japanese entities, and striking the trial courtfs order of 
dismissal, and further remanding this matter to the trial court 
for further proceedings. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of October, 1986, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
A~,£ 
ROBERT Gj/GI] 
Attorneys for Appellant Mansour 
& r~ DANIEL DARGER 
Attorneys for Appellant\Parry 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instruments were mailed, first class, postage 
prepaid on this /CK day of y J"J o \ , 1986, to the 
following counsel of record: 
H. JAMES CLEGG 
STEPHEN J. HILL 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. BOX 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorney for Respondent Okada 
GREGORY J. SANDERS 
HINZ J. MAHLER 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent Hirota 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL fclS 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF ^ TAH 
_ ^ 
FED 
BRUCE G. PARRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERNST HOME CENTER CORP, 
et. al. 
Defendants. 
/ / 
/Sr:-r^\^ 
RULING ON THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO QUASH 
SERVICE 
Civil No. 2-33206 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having reviewed the memorandum and pleadings submitted and being 
fully advised in the premises rules as follows: 
First as to defendant's motion to quash the summons 
in this matter on the basis that service upon them did not comply 
with Rule 4 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds 
that each of the defendants, Okada Hardware Ltd and Hirota Tekko KK, 
were served with a copy of the Summons and Third Party Complaint 
pursuant to the Convention of Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-
judicial Documents in Civil or Criminal Matters, by service on 
the Japanese Minister of Fireign Affairs. The Minister, by letter 
dated September 6, 1985, certified that the Summons and Third 
Party Complaint had been served on the defendant, Okada, on August 
2, 1985, and on defendant, Hirota, on August 10, 1985. 
The Court concludes that such service substantially 
complies with the requirements of Rule 4(b)(3) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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The Court having concluded that the service procedure 
was correct, next turns to the question of whether the fact that 
the Summons served on these defendants required a response within 
twenty (20) days rather than the thirty (30) days required of 
non-resident defendants under §78-27-25 Utah Code Annotated was 
such a defect as to justify the quashing of the Summons. 
The Court notes that Section 4(h) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows a summons to be amended at any time unless it 
appears that material prejudice would result to substantial rights 
of the parties. 
In the matter under consideration, each of the defendants 
was served between August 2nd and August 10thf 1985. Counsel 
for each of the defendants requested and received extentions in 
which to file pleadings until January of 1986. 
The Court concludes that defendants were properly served 
and were put on notice that they had to take action to defend 
themselves. There is no evidence that defendants relied on the 
twenty (20) day period to their detriment; on the contrary, they 
were granted in excess of one hundred (100) days to respond. Myers 
vs. Investment Corporation, 632 P2d 879 Ut. (1981) 
The Court notes that as the Utah Sumpreme Court stated 
in Myers, supra: 
"In the absence of prejudice, it is appropriate 
to pursue that policy which favors resolution 
of disputes on the merits rather than techni-
calities" Supra, P. 882 
In that light, the Court will allow the summons to be 
amended on its own motion and finds that service on the defendants 
Ruling on Motioi*.-
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of Mansour's Third Party Complaint and Summons was proper. 
Defendants have conceded, as the Court would have found, 
that service of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on these 
defendants was valid. 
The Court, having concluded that service of plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint and Mansour's Third Party Complaint against 
these defendants was valid, next turns to the more difficult ques-
tion of whether the Court has jurisdiction over these defendants 
pursuant to our Long Arm Statute and the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Section 78-27-24(3) Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
extends the jurisdiction of Utah Courts to non-resident defendants 
who cause injury within the State by tortious acts or breach of 
warranty. 
In the matter before the Court the plaintiff was allegedly 
injured by a flying piece of metal from a log splitter manufactured 
by defendant Hirota and exported to the United States by defendant 
Okada. 
Under the pleadings, it is clear that the facts of this 
case come within the purview of the Long Arm Statute so as to 
give the Court in personam jurisdiction over these defendants 
pursuant to that provision; however, the analysis does not stop 
there. No* only must the allegations place the defendants in that 
catagory of persons over whom our State legislature has extended 
State jurisdiction, but in addition must be examined to determine 
if there exists such minimum contacts between the forum state 
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and the defendants such that the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion would not offend the traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice required under the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. International Shoe Co. vs. State of Washington 
et. al., 326 US 310r 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L Ed. 95 (1945) 
At the outset it must be noted that the burden of proving 
basis for jurisdiction is on the party asserting it and that the 
facts of each case must be examined independently. 
In the matter before the Court, the Court finds the 
facts as follows: 
1. That the defendant, Hirota Manufacturing Company, 
is a Japanese company which manufactures various products in Japan 
which it sells to Okada Hardware in Japan for export to the United 
States. 
2. That Okada Hardware Ltd is a Janapese corporation 
which purchases items for exportation to the United States, among 
them the log splitter in question. 
3. That Okada Hardware exported the log splitter to 
the Third Party plaintiff, Monsour, in California for sale in 
the United States. 
4. That Monsour sold the log splitter to its distributor 
Pacific Marine Schwabaker. 
5. That Pacific Marine Schwabaker then sold the log 
splitter to various retailers in the western U.S., including 
Pay N Save/Ernst Home Center Corporation. 
6. That Ernst Home Center in Twin Falls, Idaho, sold 
the said log splitter to one Linda Thayne in December, 1979. 
Ruling on Motioiio 
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7. That said Linda Thayne gave the log splitter to 
a relative in Utah. 
8. That plaintiff was injured while using the log splitter 
in Utah in January of 1980. 
9. That the log splitter in question was never advertised 
or sold in the State of Utah. 
10. That defendants may have been informed that the 
log splitter would be sold in the western United States. 
11. That there was no evidence that either of the defendants 
either sold or advertised any of their products in the State of 
Utah. 
It is clear to the Court that under the more traditional 
concepts of "minimum contacts", the facts of this case would not 
provide sufficient basis to justify the Court in extending in 
personam jurisdiction; however, as a result of increased trade 
and interaction between the various states and nations over the 
past ten years there has developed a theory of rationale for extend-
ing jurisdiction under a doctrine referred to as the "stream of 
commerce theory" in certain cases. 
The concept was most recently treated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in World-Wide Volkwagon Corp. vs. Woodson, 444 US 286, 100 
S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed 2d 490(1980); and even more recently by our 
own 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Fidelty Casualty Co. vs. 
Philadelphia Resins Corp, (USCA 10th Cir.) 766 F2d 440 (1985). 
In World-Wide, supra, the Supreme Court refused to grant 
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in personam jurisdiction over a New York Audi dealer and distributor 
doing business in New Yorkf New Jersey and Connecticut, to an 
Oklahoma court. In that case, plaintiff, who had purchased the 
vehicle from defendant in New York, was injured in Oklahoma while 
on his way to Arizona in an accident which involved an alleged 
defect in the vehicle. 
The Court, in denying jurisdiction to the Oklahoma court, 
found no circumstances on which to predicate in personam jurisdiction 
and stated: 
"Petitioners (defendants)carry on no activity 
whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and 
perform no services there. They avail themselves 
of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma 
law. They solicit no business there either through 
sales persons or through advertising reasonably 
calculated to reach the state. Nor does the record 
show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale 
or retail to Oklahoma residents, or customers, or 
that they indirectly, through other, serve or seek 
to serve the Oklahoma market". World-wide, supra 
62 LEd 2d 493. 
The Court went on to say that Oklahoma was attempting 
to assert jurisdiction on one isolated occurance and whatever 
inferences that could be drawn therefrom and that was not a sufficent 
basis for jurisdiction. 
In a more recent case, and one involving the application 
of Utah law, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to extend 
in personam jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania corporation where 
some of its defective cable, sold in Arkansas, was subsequently 
brought to Utah by the purchaser and caused damage in Utah. 
Fidelty Casualty Co. vs. Philadelphia Resins Corp., supra. 
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The facts in that case were that a helicopter pilot 
in Arkansas purchased fiber cable from defendant in Pennsylvania 
for delivery in Arkansas. An employee of the defendant was told 
it would be used in the Rocky Mountains in seismic operations. 
The pilot brought the cable to Utah where it failed, causing damage. 
The evidence showed that the pilot had seen advertising for the 
cable in a national trade magazine which presumably reached Utah; 
that defendant sold a variety of products in all fifty states? 
that from 1978 through 1980 defendant sold to 10 customers in 
Utah; that Utah sales were less than 1/10 of 1% of defendant's 
gross sales; that defendant never sold any cable in Utah. 
The Court, in denying jurisdiction, held that a miniscule 
number of sales of products other than cable, advertising in a 
national trade magazine that presumably reaches Utah, and the 
failure of one of its defective cables in Utah after the cable 
was taken there by a customer, was not sufficient minimum contacts 
to justify the lower courtfs imposing in personam jurisdiction 
over the defendant. 
In so ruling the Court stated that if defendant's products 
come into the forum state as the result of the actions of an un-
connected third party or of fortuitous events over which defendant 
has no control, the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the forum state. 
The Court further noted that foreseeability alone has 
never been a sufficient benchmark for in personam jurisdiction 
under Due Process. The mere liklihood that a product would find 
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its way into the forum state was not enough; rather, it is that 
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are 
such that he should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court 
there. 
In this case the plaintiff and Third Party defendant, 
Monsour, have the burden of proving to the Court sufficient basis 
to justify the extention of in personam jurisdiction over these 
defendants. While this court does not entirely agree with the 
decision of the Circuit Court in Fidelity, supra, it does find 
that the facts in this case are insufficient to support in personam 
jurisdiction over the defendants Hirota Tekko KK and Okada Hardware 
Co., Ltd. and the complaints against these defendants are dismissed. 
Counsel for Okada is directed to prepare an Order in 
accordance with the Court's ruling. 
DATED this _ ^ \ day of February, A.D., 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
£JJ..^ J . (x~~ 
RODNEY S^/PAGE 
District Court Judge 
Ruling on Motion^ 
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of the foregoing Ruling on Motions to Mary Ellen Sloan, 1000 
Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Roger Fairbanks, 
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on the Zf)^ day °f February, postage prepaid. 
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Deputy-Clerk 
Jerry H. Kindinger 
RYAN, SWANSON, HENDEL & CLEVELAND 
32nd Floor, The Bank of California Center 
Seattle, Washington 98164 
Telephone: (206) 464-4224 
Roger P. Christensen 
Richard C. Rife 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE G. PARRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERNST HOME CENTER CORPORATION, 
a Washington corporation; PAY 
fN SAVE, a Washington corpora-
tion; ERNST HOME CENTER CORP., 
doing business in Idaho; TOM 
McCLOSKEY; MONSOUR, INC., d/b/a 
West Coast Mercantile Company 
and also known as WECO; JOHN 
DOE #1 a citizen or subject of 
a foreign state; and JOHN DOE 
#2, a citizen or subject of a 
foreign state, 
Defendants. 
ERNST HOME CENTER CORPORATION, 
a V/ashington corporation; PAY 
'N SAVE, a Washington corpora-
tion; ERNST HOME CENTER CORP., 
doing business in Idaho, 
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
TO ERNST HOME CENTER CORP., 
PAY 'N SAVE AND ERNST HOME 
CENTER CORP. (Idaho) 
Civil No. 33206 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
PACIFIC MARINE SCHWABACHER, a 
foreign corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Defendants Ernst Home Center Corporation, Pay !N Save, and Ernst 
Home Center Corp. (hereinafter "Ernst") hereby answers plaintiff Bruce C* 
Parry's interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the name, address & occupation of the 
person answering these interrogatories on behalf of the foregoing 
defendants. 
ANSWER NO .1: Dale L. Colbert 
Former Ernst Tool buyer 
5305 80th Street East 
Tacoma, Washington 98011 
Scott Grant 
Director of Loss Prevention 
1511 6th Avenue 
Seattle, WA 98101 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: State the factual basis for your claim in the 
Third Defense that the accident and injuries were caused by misuse of the 
product by plaintiff. 
ANSWER NO. 2: The photograph of the log splitter in question 
indicates a chip on the blunt end of the tool. Normal use of the log splitter 
involves striking wood with the sharp end of the tool. Using the tool as a 
sledge hammer to strike or drive hard materials is a misapplication, which 
the location of the chip on the blunt end of the log splitter indicates. 
Discovery is continuing, and further evidence of misuse may be discovered. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the factual basis of your claim in the 
Fourth Defense that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence and assumption of 
the risk* 
ANSWER NO. 3: Plaintiff may have struck a metal object with this 
"wood splitting maul." In addition, plaintiff failed to use elementary 
safety equipment such as protective eyewear. Discovery is continuing, and 
further evidence of negligence and assumption of the risk may be discovered* 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: State the factual basis of your claim in the 
Fifth Defense that the accident and injuries complained of were caused by the 
negligence of third parties. 
ANSWER NO. 4: Ernst has not done sufficient discovery at this time 
to state what other parties were involved. Ernst will supplement this 
answer following the completion of discovery. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: State whether the product was for sale or 
offered for sale at any time at the Ernst Home Center Corp. doing business in 
Twin Falls, Idaho (hereinafter "Ernst, Idaho"). 
ANSWER NO. 5: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: If your answer to No. 5 is yes, state the 
dates that the product was available for sale at Ernst, Idaho. 
ANSWER NO* 6: The product has been available for sale at Ernst in 
Idaho on an intermittent basis. Each store orders its own products and, 
therefore, Ernst is unable to determine the dates the product was available. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: If there is more than one Ernst Home Center 
in Twin Falls, state the addresses of each store. 
ANSWER NO. 7: There is only one Ernst Home Center in Twin Falls, 
Idaho. 
BnSftftQG&SOM TO. §\ ^as thfc product fc^ilablfc ?or aal^ in ^ Y^ 
State of Utah by Ernst and Pay fN Save? 
ANSWER NO. 8; The product w£S available for sale in the State of 
Utah by Ernst Home Center Corporation only. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: If your answer to No. 8 is yes, state the 
dates that the product was available for sale and the locations that it was 
available for sale. 
ANSWER NO. 9: The product was available for sale at all Ernst Home 
Center locations in Utah. Ernst is unable to determine the dates the 
product was available. See answer to Interrogatory 6. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: What is the relationship between Ernst Home 
Center Corporation and Pay fN Save; and between Ernst Home Center 
Corporation and Ernst Home Center, Idaho? 
ANSWER NO. 10: Ernst Home Center Corporation and Ernst Home 
Center, Idaho are both divisions of Pay Ml Save Corporation of Washington. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: From whom did Ernst and Pay Mtf Save obtain 
the product for retail sale. 
ANSWER NO. 11: On information and belief, Ernst obtained the 
product from Pacific Marine Schwaba^her, now doing business as Pacific 
Marine. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 12: Does Ernst and Pay f N Save presently sell or 
offer for sale the product? 
ANSWER NO. 12: Ernst does; Pay fN Save does not. 
INTERROGATORY NO* 13: If your answer to No. 12 is yes, state the 
names and addressees of each store in which it is offered for sale. 
® 
ANSWER NO* 13: The product is offered for sale in all Ernst Home 
Center locations* 
INTERROGATORY NO, 14: Does Ernst and Pay fN Save contend that it 
and all agents or employees of theirs had no knowledge whatsoever of any 
hazard, danger, defect or defective condition existing in the product and/or 
the subject product prior to the alleged occurrence? 
ANSWER NO. 14: Ernst objects to this interrogatory on the grounds 
that it is vague and ambiguous. In the spirit of cooperation, however, and 
without waiving its objection, Ernst will say that the product, like all 
cutting and striking tools, has some inherent and obvious dangers and 
hazards„ Ernst did not have knowledge of any defect or defective condition 
existing in the product. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: If the answer to the preceding 
interrogatory is in the negative1 please identify all hazards, dangers, 
defects, or defective conditions in the product and/or* subject product of 
which Ernst's and Pay !N Save, its agents, or its employees had knowledge 
prior to the alleged occurrence, stating for each such hazards, danger, 
defect or defective condition: 
a. How and from whom did Ernst and Pay fN Save or its agent(s) or 
employe^s) gain such knowledge; 
b. the identity, by name, address and job title of the agent(s) or 
employe^s) of Ernst and Pay fN Save who first acquired such knowledge; 
c. when such knowledge was acquired; 
d> a full description of the hazard, danger, defect or defective 
condition; 
f. the action or actions, if any, Ernst and Pay fN Save or any agent 
or employee of them took to warn of, repair or correct such defect or 
defective condition so as to safeguard the plaintiff or any user of the 
product * 
g. the possible results of such hazard, danger, defect or 
defective condition which Ernst and Pay fN Save foresaw. 
ANSWER NO. 15: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Has Ernst and Pay fN Save ever conducted any 
recall campaigns, operations, programs or activities which involved the 
product or similar products? 
ANSWER NO. 16: Not to Ernst's knowledge. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 17: If the answer to the preceding 
interrogatory is in the affirmative, please state and describe in complete 
detail each such recall campaign, operation, program or activity, including 
but not limited to such information as: 
a. the exact date of the announcement or beginning of the campaign 
or operation; 
b» the purpose of the campaign or operation, in terms of potential 
or real defects sought to be checked and/or corrected; 
c. the types or model of products involved in the campaign or 
operation; 
d. the number of products of each type referred to in sub-section 
(c) sought to be examined and/or corrected. 
e. the number of products of each type actually examined and/or 
corrected. 
ANSWER NO. 17: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 16: Has Ernst and Pay fN Save ever been cited, 
criticized, or reprimanded with respect to this product and state the name 
and address of the person who has custody of the records relating to same? 
ANSWER NO, 18: Not to Ernst's knowledge. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Has there ever been any litigation 
initiated against Ernst and Pay !N Save concerning the product, and alleged 
defect? If so, please: 
a. give the title and date of each such action; 
b. outline the contents of the complaint filed in each such action; 
c. state the name and address of the court involved; 
d. give the name and address of the attorney for the plaintiff in 
each such action. 
ANSWER NO. 19: Not to Ernst's knowledge. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 20: State if Ernst and Pay fN Save has retained 
any expert with respect to this matter and state whether the expert has 
prepared a written report. 
ANSWER NO. 20: Not at this time. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: If the answer to the foregoing 
interrogatory is in the affirmative, state the name and address and 
professional title of said expert and state the substance of the facts that 
said expert is expected to testify to, the opinion held by said expert and 
which he will testify to, and the grounds of each opinion that said expert 
will testify to. 
ANSWER NO. 21: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Does Ernst and Pay fN Save, its attorneys, 
or agents, have any statements taken from any person concerning the 
happening or event giving rise to this action, other than statements 
supplied by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER NO. 22: Not at this time. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: If the answer to the foregoing 
interrogatory is in the affirmative, state the name arid last known address of 
each person from whom a statement was taken, the date when said statement was 
taken, who was present when the statement was given, whether such statement 
is in writing or has been reduced to writing, and who has possession or 
custody of the statement or a copy hereof. 
ANSWER NO. 23: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Does Ernst and P£y fN Save have any 
photographs of the product or the subject product? 
ANSWER NO. 24: Not to Ernst's knowledge. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 25: If your answer to No. 24 is yes, state the 
name and address of the person who has possession of said photographs. 
ANSWER NO. 25: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY N0» 26: Do you or did you manufacture the product 
described in plaintiff's complaint? 
ANSWER NO. 26: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: If not, state: 
a. the name and address of each manufacturer or supplier from whom 
you obtained this product; 
b. the tradename of the product; 
c. whether you prepared specifications concerning the size, 
design or other qualities of this product. 
d. whether you obtained any written warranties concerning the 
product from your suppliers. 
ANSWER NO. 27: 
a. Okiedo is the manufacturer of this product. Its address, on 
information and belief, is P.O. Box 22, Meki, Hyogo-Pref, Japan. Cecil 
Mansour is the importer of this product. His address is: 5409 West Adams, 
Los Angeles, California 90016. 
b. Weco maul. 
c. No specifications were prepared. 
d. No warranties were prepared. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: State verbatim the written specification 
you submitted, or written warranties you received, concerning the qualities 
of the product. 
ANSWER N0> 28: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Did or are you aware of anyone who performed 
any chemical and/or metallographic analysis of the product? 
ANSWER NO. 29: Not known. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 30: If so, state!: 
a. the name, address and job title of each person who was in charge 
of each test performed. 
b. the date each test was conducted% 
c. the method used to sample the material that was tested. 
d. the size of the samples tested. 
e. a description of procedure used to prepare the samples for 
testing* 
f. the results of the chemical and/or metallographic analysis* 
ANSWER NO. 30: Not applicable. 
nrraFffiPGftTPiri ~RD. 31: Describe in detail £rnst and "Pay VI\I Savers 
relationship to the product, either as manufacturer, assembler, importer, 
retailer, etc. 
ANSWER NO. 31: Retailer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 32: State the length of time the product has 
been available for retail sale by Ernst and Pay 'N Save in the United States. 
ANSWER NO. 32: Unknown. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 33: Did Ernst and Pay 'N Save provide written 
warranties regarding the product? 
ANSWER N0> 33: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3^: If so, please state the warranty verbatim. 
ANSWER NO. 3^: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 35: Did Ernst and Pay VA Save inspect t'ne 
product for defects in manufacture? 
ANSWER NO. 35: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 36: State the names, addresses, and 
occupations of any and all individuals known to Ernst and Pay 'N Save that 
would have knowledge of the manufacture, export, import, distribution, or of 
the retailing of the product. 
ANSWER NO. 36: Present distributor: Jensen Byrd Co., 310 West 
Riverside Ave., Spokane, Wash. 99220; prior distributor: Pacific Marine 
Schwabacher; Importer: Cecil Mansour, 5409 West Adams, Los Angeles, CA 
90016. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 37: Are Ernst and Pay 'N Save incorporated in 
the State of Utah or authorized to do business in "Ota'n? 
ANSWER NO. 37: Ernst and Pay fN Save are authorized to do business 
in Utah* 
INTERROGATORY NO, 38: If your answer is yes, state-the date of 
incorporation or when authorization was received and whether Ernst and Pay 
fN Save continue to be incorporated or authorized to do business in Utah* 
ANSWER NO. 38: December 28, 1983. 
DATED this '/5 day of April, 1984. 
Dale L. Colbert 
/ -
STATE OF //JrtAM7l#fa 
//, • (1 : ss. 
COUNTY OF MM U ) 
On the o?vS day of '^//dZ^- , 1984, personally appeared 
before me Dale L. Colbert, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
NOTAW^BLIC - residing in: 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE / 
This is to certify that on the //-— day offfipfrSl, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
500 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jerry Kindinger 
RYAN, SWANSON, HENDEL & CLEVELAND 
32nd Floor, The Bank of California Center 
Seattle, Washington 98164 
Gary D. Stott 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 ; 
^ r . W'rfJ.U'U 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTS OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE G. PARRY 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ERNST HOME CENTER CORP. < 
Defendants. 
mn. i NG 
Case No. 33206 
The pi aintiffs having filed a Motion to Reconsider xn u^-d 
matter and counsel having tiled Memorandums in support thereof 
arid in opposition thereto, and the ('.•••.»: naving reviewed the 
same here • :: 
The CVM]', it?e.is ii'ia\ t-i ocedure and the law do not preclude 
the Court's considerationi .: a Motion to Reconsider, - , - *h.: -\ 
MT : o: . r.y limited c, i :umstances u.tn the or-iec t:r r--
placir.q ~ *,'^ti' irr)r p ^ ' + • - owl edgeable about 
their c .•. .
 t -^~. • * 
cons .aerat i: « '• i th- appropriate time. 
j n ^his xaatter i • * *:<• -itJLcal question,, of jurisdiction the 
position of co-counsel *i^  ^ ase the Court has reconsidered, its 
decision based, upon, the new material submitter bu1 t .-ids- tha? as 
her e wiii? re ile f encJari t; s a re i so l a t e d 1: 
distribution from the transaction which caused the injury, the 
mere fact that the product is sold in this state does not alter 
the Court's opinion. The Court still concludes that the 
defendant engaged in no purposeful contacts with the State of 
Utah which would provide the necessary minimum contacts to 
justify the State exercising jurisdiction in this matter. 
The Court also stands by its ruling that defendant Hirota 
Tekko did not submit itself to jurisdiction of the Court by its 
letter of response. 
The Court will execute the order of dismissal of Okada 
Hardware and Hirota Tekko forthwith. 
DATED this day of April, A.D., 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY S. PAGE 
District Court Judge 
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BRUCE G PARRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERNST HOML CTNTKK < '(HKPORA I' 1 fill, 
et. al., 
Defendants, 
ERNST HOME CENTER, et. al., 
. Third-Party 
"Plaintiffs 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
vs. 
HIROTA TEKKO K.K., 
HARDWARE CO., LTD. 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Robert G. Gilchrist being first duly sworn deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That he is counsel of record for defendant 
and third-party plaintiff Mansour, Inc. in the above 
captioned matter. 
2. That during March of 1985, he filed a 
stipulation and received an order from this court allowing him 
to file and serve a third-party complaint, naming as third-
party defendants Okada Hardware Company, Ltd., and Hirota 
Tekko, K.K. That he then submitted these documents to the 
United States Marshall's Office in Salt Lake City for service 
upon these Japanese companies. 
3. That on or about April 22, 1985, he received 
a letter from T. Miyauchi, counsel general of Japan, 
indicating he was returning the third-party complaints and 
summons, as they had not been translated into Japanese. 
4* On or about June 3, 1985, a Japane&e version 
o;£ the third-party complaints and summons were submitted ±o 
the United States Marshall's Office for service upon the named 
third-party defendants. 
5. On or about September 6, 1985, he received a 
letter from T. Miyauchi indicating that Okada Hardward 
had been served with the third-party complaint and summons on 
August 2, 1985. 
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6. •*' September 
?t^~ * aefendant 
. . Tekko, ; . : .,*;: — erved v. ' . * J * r.ird-party 
.omplaint and summons - - August . 
7. 
~ -- : . Masakazu :i ; 
:.,<- president c: third-party defendant Hirota Tekk 
responding * <- ** rd-party complaint and summon? 
statir matter. 
8. On v.; -^  .. September ;-~5 t^- submitted 
the original cf tr. . statement ; */ * Hirota t,w t;.^ wuuii 
for fiiir- *.=> trie -- - - - - --
9. Septembe. *, 198? he was 
contacted by attorney Dennis Conroy, who indicated that he 
planned t: srrear >- counsel for defendant Okada, and 
requeste q 
extensic. .: . granted. 
10. On or about September 24, 1985, he was 
contacted by .Hirota !s current ; - t'*?d cm 
exte . • i MI wn J i n T. O :*.* responsive pleading r--
behalf : -* parties. This extension was granted. 
11. On November III, 10 8 5, he re 
second teleph; n i i i »t ,i s < - u r r e n i 
sel, requesting a continuance of the extension of time i n 
which to file a responsive pleading. This extension was 
granted. 
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12. On or about December 18, 1985, he received a 
telephone call from Okada's current counsel who requested an 
extension of time until January 6, 1985, to file a responsive 
pleading. This extension was granted. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED t h i s [if ~~ day o f \S^~+*JtJ\ , 1 9 8 6 . 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
ROBERT \C. GILCHftTST 
/hftnmnrf 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this fp> day of 
a , 1986. 
NOTARY PUBLIC /
 0/3 7 My Commission Expires: "PUB (
 0A / 
P
 Sliding KtiJ^Jdt. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true_and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage 
prepaid on this /&*• day of.//gmudba-^ , 1986, to the 
following counsel of record: (/ ^ 
H. James Clegg 
Stephen J. Hill 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. BOX 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Hinz J. Mahler 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger R. Fairbanks 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWLLL 
900 Kearns Building 
13 6 South Main street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8.1 Id 
Donald J. Purser 
ROE, FOWLER & MOXLEY 
340 East 400 South 
Salt Lake Ci*", T1- • ° ' 1 "• " 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
1000 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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